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Background 
Save the Children US started working in Battagram district after the October 8th 2005 earthquake. 
From 2007, SC (US) entered a public-private partnership to revitalise primary health care in the 
district through reconstruction, equipment, provision of supplies, management support and training. 
In addition, from 2008, SC (US) started a performance-based incentive (PBI) scheme, whereby all 
government-employed health facility workers were entitled to receive an additional 20-35 percent of 
their pay, according to performance criteria. This project was funded by the World Bank. Its budget 
was just under $3 million.  
Objectives of review 
As the project draws to a close in June 2010, SC (US) has commissioned a review of the project, in 
particular the PBI component. The aims of the review are: 
1. To assess the mechanism and effectiveness of the performance based incentives given to the 
staff during the project life; 
2. To assess the effects of performance based incentives in terms of individual performance by 
staff; 
3. To assess the costs of the performance based incentive component;  
4. To prepare a short report on the performance based incentives and its costs giving 
recommendations to the Government 
 
Review methods 
A very “light touch” review was carried out in June 2010 using quantitative analysis of HMIS data, 
financial records and project documents. In addition, 11 key informant interviews were carried out 
with stakeholders at SC (US), the World Bank, and in the provincial and district offices. At facility 
level, in-depth interviews were held with seven managers and other staff working at four facilities 
(three BHUs and one RHC), and 11 focus group discussions with staff and community members were 
organised. 
 
Description of PBI 
The PBI has been designed around two measurement tools – one is a supervisory checklist, which is 
filled each month by an independent monitor (often from SC US), who checks on qualitative issues 
such as hygiene of the facility, functionality of equipment, maintenance of registers etc. The second 
is a set of targets set for preventive services, including coverage of ANC, deliveries by skilled birth 
attendants, post-natal care, newborn weighing, growth monitoring for under-threes, and three 
immunisation indicators (TT2 completed, infant immunisation started and immunisation completed). 
An overall weight of 40% was given to the qualitative indicators and 60% to the quantitative. 
According to the combined score reached, staff received a monthly supplement to basic pay of 20-
35%, paid to all staff on the government payroll (which is managed in the district by SC US at 
present). 
 
Assessment of Performance Based Incentive mechanism and Economic Analysis of the 
Battagram Project 
 
 
 
June 2010 
4 
Impact on services 
The review concluded that the project as a whole has contributed to an increase in the functionality 
of the health system and its outputs, as indicated by the interviews with staff and clients and also by 
the trends in specific services. Deliveries with skilled birth attendants, for example, increased by 150 
per cent between July 2008 and April 2010 (see figure 1). Immunisation, while more variable month 
by month, still increased by 89% at BHU level, comparing the first six months of the project with the 
last six months. At RHC there was a reduction over the project lifetime – however, if this represents 
services shifting to the primary level, then that is an appropriate switch. Analysis of the TT2 uptake 
supports the view that users have been enabled to seek immunisation services at lower level 
facilities. 
 
Figure 1. Number of deliveries attended by SBAs monthly in BHUs and RHCs from July 2008-April 
2010, Bhattagram district 
 
 
No data has been found for the period prior to the project to examine to what extent these positive 
trends are a continuation of previous trends, or a shift in the trend line. Comparing the MICs survey 
of 2001 with that of 2008, it can be seen that deliveries with SBAs had already risen significantly at 
district and province level by the time of the introduction of the PBIs, from 14% to 40.5 in Battagram 
and from 28 to 41% in the province as a whole. There are no comparable data for the other 
indicators. However, given the devastation wrought by the earthquake, it is fair to assume that much 
of the growth in services can be attributed to the project.  
 
Whether it can be attributed to the PBI component is more contentious. The PBI represented 24% of 
the total project expenditure, and was accompanied by considerable additional investments in 
salaries, infrastructure, training, equipment and management support. The case studies of individual 
facilities suggest that general investments in staffing and upgrading facilities have been the main 
factors behind improved service delivery. Individual facilities show great fluctuations over time in 
performance scores, in particular, which are commonly linked with the availability (or absence) of 
key staff, such as doctors and nurses. 
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The review also concluded that the despite the focus on preventive care of the indicators, other 
services (as tracked very broadly through out-patient attendances) had not been squeezed out by 
the project. Analysis of total OPD visits over the project period reveal that utilisation rates rose from 
0.42 per person per year (based on the first four months of the project) to 0.51 per person for the 
last four months. This is a rise of 22%, which is significant, although still well below the WHO norm of 
2 OPDs per person per year. At the RHC level, the increase was from 1.13 to 1.85 per person per year 
– an increase of 63%.  
 
Design of PBI 
In terms of design, the use of two different scoring methods – one based broadly on ‘process factors’ 
which staff can directly influence (such as the cleanliness of the facility), and the other based on 
outputs, which are important but can only be partly influenced by supply-side actions, is seen to 
represent a good balance. Average scores were higher for the supervision scores (73%) than the 
performance ones (46%), as performance indicators are ‘stickier’ and change more slowly (especially 
skilled deliveries, which are affected by important community beliefs, as well as cost and other 
access barriers). Differential thresholds for targets allowed for the fact that some indicators (e.g. 
ANC) start at much higher levels than others (e.g. facility deliveries). 
 
The two scores were correlated, as would be expected  – generally, facilities with higher average 
supervision scores also had higher average performance scores, although the range was much 
greater for the latter (5% - 48%), while supervision only spanned 20% - 37%. 
 
Implementation issues 
In terms of its implementation, the perception of the PBI amongst staff was positive – importantly, it 
was seen as being objective and as rewarding the performance of the whole facility. There were 
however some concerns in relation to equity – the main one related to the different treatment of 
staff hired by SC (US), who are on a higher pay-scale and not included in the PBI scheme. The 
motivation behind this is not clear, but it does suggest that the PBI was being used primarily as a 
salary top-up for public servants.  
 
The process for measuring performance appears to have functioned well for the BHUs and RHCs, 
although there were months in which no assessment was made (and facilities received an automatic 
score, which clearly undermines the approach). The average number of supervisions missed, per 
facility over the project lifetime, was 1.5, but for some facilities it reached 10-12 months (out of 30). 
There were also some discrepancies between the overall score reached and the level of incentive 
paid, but these were limited. The fact that payments were made directly into bank accounts, and 
were proportionate to income, removed the element of individual discretion that can prove very 
corrosive in performance management schemes. 
 
The system has worked less well for the civil dispensaries (CDs). All of the CDs scored less than 20 on 
the supervisory scores, and only one score higher than 10. The incentive paid to its staff never 
exceeded 20 percent. In addition, from the records it seems that the CDs were not visited regularly 
as part of the supervision and monitoring.  
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Motivational effects of the PBI component 
The structure of the incentives did however raise some questions in relation to their effectiveness in 
motivating higher performance. Under the current system, a facility scoring a combined score of 0 
would still receive an incentive of 20%. In order to receive the additional 15%, it would need to rise 
to 70% and higher – would that effort be justified? Interviews with staff suggested some scepticism, 
especially when the opportunity costs (no private practice) were considered. 
 
A successful PBI scheme (one which motivated individuals and teams) would be expected to produce 
positive trends in performance scores, positive trends in incentives and also variation over time in 
the position of individual facilities, reflecting differential effort or ability. In Bhattagram, the 
supervision score component actually fell by 1 point (or -3%), reflecting its high starting point, while 
the performance score increased by 9 points (or 36%). However, the overall incentive score rose only 
by 2 points (7%) over the life of the project (comparing the first six months with the last six months), 
and payments to individual staff did not increase on average over time. This suggests that the overall 
project has been effective but that the link with the performance measurement system and 
incentives is weak. 
 
Figure 2. Average total score for each BHU and RHC between September  2008 
and April 2010 
 
On average, no facilities were graded as poor, and two-thirds fell within the incentive of 30%-35% 
band (see figure 2), suggesting that the scale was not sufficiently sensitive (or that all facilities are 
really achieving on the same high level).  Moreover facilities maintained more or less their position in 
relation to the starting point, and moved in synchronised patterns (see figure 3). Those with higher 
performance at the start appear to have made more progress over time than those lower down. This 
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indicates that prior features (either features relating to the services or to the communities served) 
constrained their ability to change their performance and that it was also influenced by shared 
external factors. 
 
Figure 3. Scoring for incentives for individual health facilities from September 
2008 until March 2010 
 
Given that the incentives are meant to range from 20 per cent to 35% of pay, it is not clear why the 
average found in this study was 16% of basic pay overall (see figure 4), and lower at BHU level (13%). 
This was also commented on by staff, who requested a higher level of incentive (50-100% of pay). 
The high payments to administration (68%) raise questions too.  
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Figure 4. Incentive as a proportion of basic salary in Battagram Distrct in 2009-
10 
 
Overall stakeholder feedback on project 
Stakeholder feedback was positive about the project as a whole – communities particularly 
appreciated the low cost of services and the improvements to supply, including the availability of 
staff and medicines, and improvements in quality and appearance of the facilities. Recommendations 
include putting more emphasis on community-based activities, developing a closer relationship with 
the district and provincial authorities, particularly in relation to handing over the project, and 
providing more detailed feedback to staff on their performance, including discussion of how to 
improve it.  
 
Sustainability of approach 
The project as a whole cost 184% of the district health expenditure, while the PBI element on its own 
was equivalent to 44% (see table 1). Although the cost of the PBI element is low in USD per capita 
terms (USD 0.68 per person in the district per year), it is nevertheless high compared to the public 
spend of $1.57. The costs of the external monitoring which is required to support the PBI system 
have not been isolated but would also prove a barrier in scaling up or replicating this project. 
Stakeholders also expressed concerns about the sustainability of the project, given financial, 
managerial and organisational constraints in the public health sector. 
 
Table 1. Total expenditure on project and on PBI per capita in district 
Battagram, 2008-10 
  
Total 
expenditure 
2008-2010, USD 
Expenditure 
in one year, 
USD 
Per capita 
per 
annum 
spend, 
USD 
Ratio of 
expenditure to 
government 
Overall project 2,095,297                  2.88 1.84 
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838,119  
PBI component 497,103 
                   
198,841  
0.68 0.44 
Government expenditure 
on health 
                       
1205671  
                   
482268 
1.65   
Total 
                       
3,233,333  
                
1,293,333  
                   
4.45  
  
 
Conclusions 
The review concluded that the SC (US) project in Battagram has contributed significantly to 
rebuilding district health services. It has done so at a cost of less than $4.5 per capita (combining 
project and district health expenditure) and has achieved significant growth in outputs. Staff, 
managers and clients are appreciative of the gains in availability and quality of services. 
 
At the same time, the role that the PBI component has played is less clear – PBI has formed a 
relatively small component of pay, and has not increased in line with outputs. There is little evidence 
from interviews and data that the conditional element of the PBIs is influencing behaviour. They are 
appreciated as a top-up to pay, but remain low in absolute and relative terms, and only slightly and 
indirectly related to individual performance. 
 
The PBI component has nevertheless provided useful learning opportunities. It has demonstrated 
that a transparent and objective process for measuring performance of a facility as a whole can be 
implemented in Pakistan without causing staff resentment. It has demonstrated that a PBI approach 
focussed on preventive care can boost those services without reducing curative visits. It has 
pioneered a ‘scorecard’ system which recognises the importance of process and output indicators, 
and has added to the growing literature on how and in what circumstance performance-based 
incentives can play a role in health care in low- and middle-income countries. This is acknowledged 
as an area which deserves more study internationally.  
 
Recommendations 
There is now an urgent need for SC (US), together with the district and provincial authorities, to plan 
for an exit strategy for the project. The rehabilitation stage is more or less complete and there are 
concerns that an abrupt hand-over will lead to the collapse of currently functional facilities. The 
focus should be on ensuring reliable drug supplies and maintaining affordable prices for users. An 
element of ‘hardship’ pay to retain staff in rural areas is likely to be essential (not least because 
expectations are now set at a higher level), but whether this requires a complex framework of facility 
indicators, or can be linked to something more simple, such as regular attendance, should be 
discussed by all stakeholders. Other recommendations which should be discussed are how to get 
greater support and involvement from the province, and how to set up systems for interactive 
review of constraints and successes with staff at the facility level. Despite the monitoring procedures 
in the PBI process (with monthly external visits to fill in checklists), staff did not feel that they were 
closely involved in the assessment process, nor did all have a clear understanding of how it was 
meant to work.  
 
 
